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AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP
SUIT IN PARTNERSHIP NAME

N 1940 the legislature in its adoption of the Rules of Civil
Procedure transplanted to Texas a rule stemming from Federal Rule 17 (b)' which is now formulated as Texas Rule 28:
"A partnership or other unincorporated association, or an individual
doing business under an assumed name, may sue or be sued in the
partnership, assumed, or common name for the purpose of enforcing
for or arainst it a suibstantive right."'
Prior to the incorporation of this entity concept in our rules of

procedure, the statutes of this state were silent on the point, the
most relevant commitment being Article 6133' which provided
that an unincorporated joint stock company may sue or be sued
in its company or distinguishing name, but with no inference or
reference as to the suability of a partnership as an entity. The
decisions construing the new Rule 28 have been scant, but appear
uniformly to have followed the obvious interpretation, which abrogates the common law rule on the matter and recognizes a partnership, at least for purposes of suit, as an identity apart from the
members composing it. The most recent Texas case on the point is

Dillard v. Smith,' which concentrates the present procedure rule
into simple form:
"The scope of Rule 28 is purely procedural. In so far as it applies to
persons operating a business under an assumed name, it permits such
persons to be made parties under the assumed or common name as well
as under their individual names. Under a majority of the opinions of
the Court of Civil Appeals prior to the adoption of this rule, a person
could not be sued under a trade or assumed name; it was necessary that
such person be sued under his individual name. Rule 28 was not in-

I RULEs of CIVIL PaOCEDURE FOR DISmICT COURTS OF U. S. (1934).
2 Rule 28, TzxAs RULES OF CIvI. PROCEDURE (1940).
3 Tx. REV. Civ. STAT. (Vernon's. 1925) art. 6133.
4 .___T .......... 205 S. W. (2d) 366 (1947).
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tended to change the substantive rights of the owners of a business
operated under an assumed name. The effect of the rule is simply that
such owners may now be sued under the trade or assumed name of the
business as well as in their individual names."'
A secondary point of importance arising in the case concerns
not the style in which suits may be brought by or against the partnership, but the residence of the partnership as determinative as
venue. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals
view that the partnership can have no residence for venue purposes
other than the residence of the partners, regardless of whether
the partnership be regarded as a legal entity created by Rule 28,
separate and distinct from the partners who compose it, or merely
as a contractual status between the partners. It assents to the conclusion that though the plea of privilege be filed by a legal entity,
the only basis for it is the residence of the partners, since apart
from the residence of the partners, the legal entity has no residence. The Dillard case was a personal injury suit arising out of
a collision involving a vehicle belonging to the defendant transport
company. The operation of Rule 28 was invoked when the transport company entered an appearance in the cause as a legal entity
under the rule by filing a plea of privilege alleging that it was
not a resident of Bexar County, where suit was filed, but that each
of the defendant partners was a resident of Edwards County. The
Court of Civil Appeals in consideration of such plea, in harmony
with orthodox partnership principles, accorded with the rule that
the partnership could not have a residence in Edwards County
unless the owner or owners of the business reside there, and declared that the plea, if valid as to the transport company, should
be construed as asserting that the transport company resided in
Edwards County because Coy and Edna Dillard resided in said
county and were the owners thereof. Thus while recognizing that
Rule 28 ushers in a procedural innovation with reference to suit
in the partnership name, the Texas courts still adhere to the common law rule that in matters of venue, regardless of the capacity
s

Id. at 367.
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in which the partnership may be sued, the residence of the members of the firm governs and constitutes the only possible residence
of the partnership as an entity.
The DUllard case follows and clarifies two previous Texas cases
subsequent to the enactment of the new rule,' and is in accord
with a federal case conforming to the entity concept in its construction of a similar rule.'
Prior to the adoption of Rule 28 the decisions on the suability
of a partnership in its capacity as an entity were uniform in conforming to the traditional common law policy of viewing the assocation as merely a contractual status and requiring suit to be
brought in the names of the members. The new method of procedure is worthy of note aa abrogating a venerable line of common
law authorities on the point,' and establishing for Texas a capacity

in contravention of all preceding decisions on the matter.
RENEGOTIATION ACT

Although reiterating and applying the well-established principles of accord and satisfaction as constituted by a settlement
agreement between partners at dissolution with respect to their
contractual obligations incurred by reason of such relationship,
the case of Wallace v. Larson' involves incidentally a consideration of the recent Federal Renegotiation Act,10 which will no doubt
be encountered in determining liability among partners for excess
charges under war contracts. The Act, although not disturbing the
6 Held Bros. v. Mueller-Huber Grain Co., 185 S. W. (2d) 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944);
Mims Bros. v. M. A. James, 174 S. W. (2d) 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
1 C.J. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Jones Bros., 200 Fed. 638 (S. D. Ohio
1912).
s Bubble Up Bottling Co. v. Lewis, 163 S. W. (2d) 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) ; Road
Transport Co. v. Gray, 135 S. W. (2d) 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Fenner & Bean v.
Tatum 129 S. W. (2d) 490 (TeL Civ. App. 1939); Pope v. State, 86 S. W. (2d) 475
(Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ; Payne v. Livingston, 253 S. W. 701 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; Lawn

Production Co. v. Bailey, 244 S. W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ; First National Bank of
Marshall Y.Alexander, 236 S. W. 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) ; Commonwealth Bonding
& Casualty Insurancer Co. Y. Meeks, 187 S. W. 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).

' 199 S. W. (2d) 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
10 56 STAT. 245 (1942), 50 U. S. C. A.

1191 (1947).
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fundamental principles for settling liability among partners for
firm debts, does at least impose a new type of debt which hitherto
has not been encountered in determining partnership liabilities.
The Act in essence provides that when the amounts received or
accrued under war contracts with governmental departments reflect
excessive profits, the Renegotiation Board shall hold conference
with the firm and shall endeavor to make an agreement with
respect to the elimination of such excessive profits, and in the event
of a failure of arbitration shall enter an order determining the
amount of such excessive profits and shall furnish the contractor
with the statement of such termination. Then the Secretaries of
the various departments are authorized to eliminate these excessive profits by (A) reductions in the amounts otherwise payable
to the contractor; (B) withholding from amounts otherwise due
to the contractor any amount of such excessive profits; (C) recovery from the contractor through repayment, credit, or suit any
amount of such excessive profits actually paid to him. This
liability is of course only of transitory interest and will be dissolved with the eventual settlement of all accounts resulting from
war contracts.
INTENT AS A REQUISITE OF PARTNERSHIP

A final 1947 case, which, although presenting no new point of
law, is interesting from the factual standpoint as well as the theory
contended for by counsel, is that of Lovell v. Lovell,11 a divorce
suit in which a complaint was made as to the property settlement
involved. The wife in the case had been granted a divorce but
shortly thereafter resumed living with her ex-husband under circumstances which she alleged amounted to a common law marriage. Later she contracted a statutory marriage with another man
and still later divorced him and formally remarried the original
husband. Her attorneys in order to effect a property settlement
most favorable to her interest devised the hypothesis that during
," 202 S. W. (2d) 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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her cohabitation with her first husband during the period of alleged
common law marriage, which the court found did not exist, her
activities in keeping house, doing the cooking, and at times
actually looking after the distribution business in which her husband was engaged, entitled her to a partnership interest in such
property, commensurate with the amount of her services contributed to its acquisition. The trial court so held, adjudging that
she had contributed by her efforts at least 25% in its acquisition
and was entitled to this percentage of the value of the business.
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the case and determined that
these facts called for nothing more than a simple application of
the ancient principle that partnership is a creature of contract,
and thus, as between the parties themselves, there must be a voluntary agreement and an actual intention to become partners. Since
there was no evidentiary basis for a finding that by express contract or implied understanding did the parties agree to become
partners, the intention requisite to constitute such a relationship
was lacking. The court granted that in certain situations where the
rights of third parties are involved, the court will deem an association a partnership where it has apparently functioned as such
if to hold otherwise would be prejudicial to third parties who have
relied on such appearance, but where only the rights of the alleged
partners themselves are involved, as in this case, there is no basis
for exception to the general rule that a partnership can arise only
as the result of mutual assent and intention.
A.J.R.
AGENCY AS DETERMINING VENUE

Texas Power and Light Co. v. Adamson"' held that the term
"agency or representative," as used in the Texas general venue
statute,"' which provides that suits against a private corporation
may be brought in any county in which such corporation has an
agency or representative, does not include "servant or employee."
22203 S. W. (2d) 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).

Is Tzx. Rzv. Cv. STAT. (Vernon's, 1925) art. IM5, subdliv. 23.

1948]
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The facts relied upon by the plaintiff, Adamson, to maintain
venue of a personal injury suit in Cherokee County, after defendant had filed a plea of privilege were that two persons, both of
whom operated small stores in Cherokee County as their principal
business, were authorized by defendant to collect bills owed to
defendant, stamp the bills "paid" with a stamp furnished by the
defendant, and to accept checks and deposit them in the bank to
the defendant's account and mail the deposit slips to defendant's
home office in Dallas County.
In sustaining defendant power company's plea of privilege, the
court said,
"In legal contemplation, 'representative' . . connotes the use of at
least some discretionary authority; the taking the place of the principal
and acting in furtherance of 'his
business; the power to bind the prin14
cipal in a contractual sense."

The court held, in effect, that within the meaning of the venue
statute, these persons who collected the bills were "servants or
employees," as distinguished from agents, when considered in the
light of the legislative intent of the statute.
The court, in this case, follows its prior decisions under this
subdivision of the venue statute,"5 but it is submitted that the

holding should be limited to this type fact situation and to the
question of venue.

In the older Texas cases, a master has not been termed a principal, although in more recent cases, a master has been defined as a
kind of principal."'
In a recent case,1 7 the court quotes verbatim the definition of
"master" as found in the Restatement of the Law of Agency."8
14 203 S. W. (2d) 275, 276 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
15 Talley et at. v. Shasta Oil Co., 146 S. W. (2d) 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Humble
Oil &Refining Co. v. Bell et al., 172 S. W. (2d) 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
10 RESTATEMENT, ACENCY, 1 2 (1) (Texas Annotations) (1933).
1 R. E. Cox Dry Goods Co. et a!. v. Kellogg et al., 145 S. W. (2d) 675 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940), writ of error refused.
IsRESTATEM NT, AcGNcy, 1 2 (M) (1933): "A master is a principal who employs
another to perform services in his affairs and who controls, or has the right to control, the
physical conduct of the other in the performance of the service." (Italics supplied.)
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Therefore, it would appear that the Texas courts have abandoned
the former distinction between the relationships of "Principal and
Agent" and "Master and Servant," for the purpose of general
agency law and consider the master a type of principaL1 '
In the instant case, for example, while the collectors of the electric
bills have been held to be "servants or employees" for purposes of
the venue statute, could it be said that they were not "agents" in
a contract action between one of the subscribers to the electric service and the power company in regard to an electric bill? Clearly,
payment to the collector would discharge the subscriber's debt to
defendant.' 0
On the basis of the foregoing, it will be noted that the courts have
placed a more narrow construction upon the term "agency" within
the meaning of the venue statute than for purposes of general
.agency law.
IF.M. S.

IsiWd.

292 C. J. S. 1270; 3 C. J. S. 218; Bailey v. Williams, 223 S. V. 311 (Ta. Cr. App.
1920).

